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Abstract. This paper proposes a semi-active mechanical blocking method against reflected 
light-intensity instrument based surreptitious signal gathering via vibrating window surfaces. The 
technical countersurveillance method is based on driving a piezoceramic transducer mounted on 
the window pane with a sinusoidal input coincident with the first resonant mode of the surface. 
The article evaluates the simulated surveillance data gathered experimentally on a simplified 
laboratory model when supplying the proposed blocking system with different types of 
disturbance signals. It has been found that, while the use of a high amplitude random signal does 
block surveillance attempts effectively, the resulting acoustic noise can be bothersome to the 
occupants of the protected room. However, the analysis presented here also suggests that the use 
of a sinusoidal signal with a frequency equal to the first resonant frequency of the windowpane 
disrupts surveillance signals – depending on the properties of the target – without generating 
significant acoustic by-products. Results are applicable only to reflected light-intensity systems, 
as the efficacy of the method cannot be confirmed without classified surveillance equipment with 
broader dynamic range. 
Keywords: vibration control, speech perception, modal response, audio masking, laser 
microphone, countersurveillance. 
1. Introduction 
The documented history of espionage goes back to several centuries [1] and with the advent 
of different electronic devices added to the arsenal of governments and corporations, the 
importance of developing effective technical countermeasures has been escalating throughout the 
last century. Products of the science of surveillance left classified research laboratories and have 
been turned into commercialized goods, allowing any person or organization with a sufficient 
budget to conduct long distance monitoring [2, 3]. Owing to the influence of popular culture, 
covert surveillance is mainly associated with government activity, but private companies can also 
engage in industrial and economic espionage [4]. The financial loss due to the theft of proprietary 
information is estimated at several tens of millions of dollars each year in the United States  
alone [4]. 
This article focuses mainly on one particular surveillance method: intelligence gathering 
through optical devices-informally known as laser microphones-aimed at windowpanes to pick up 
minute vibrations resulting from human speech in the room [5, 6] (see Fig. 1). Early versions of 
this approach utilizing infrared beams instead of lasers in interferometer configuration were used 
as early as 1947 by the Soviet government [7-9]. The device code named "Buran" was reliable up 
to distances of 500 m, but it was ineffective in case of rain or fog. The acquired signal was 
post-processed to remove noise with analog technology available at the time [8]. The practice of 
embedding small prisms in the window glass that are nearly invisible to the naked eye thereby 
enhancing laser sensitivity and aiding positioning was also common practice during the late years 
of the cold war [10]. 
It is widely believed that similar but more developed surveillance methods using laser 
interferometry are still extensively used by government and military units worldwide, however, 
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due to the nature of the topic this cannot be positively confirmed and evidence remains mostly 
anecdotal [2, 9, 11-13]. Though the use of laser interferometry for clandestine surveillance 
requires equipment that is expensive [14], hard to maintain and difficult to operate, it has the 
advantage that it can elude traditional technical countersurveillance methods (TCSM) usually 
aimed to block, identify or disrupt radio frequency transmission links [10]. 
 
Fig. 1. Basic principle of laser microphone surveillance 
Crude laser listening devices produce a visible beam or spot that can be identified relatively 
easily, but higher end commercial devices use infrared lasers that are invisible to the naked eye 
[1]. Also, in addition to traditional audio surveillance, reconstructing keystrokes from a computer 
keyboard using the combination of a crude laser microphone and statistical analysis software 
coupled with dictionary matching has also been demonstrated [15-17]. 
The construction of a primitive laser surveillance device using the principle of sensing the 
changes of intensity in the reflected beam is a trivial matter [1, 18] and detailed instructions  
[19-21] and usage examples [22] are readily available online. These devices consist of a laser 
source, a visible one for aiming and an infrared for surveillance, and an analog photo-sensitive 
component with a basic amplifier circuit connected to a computer sound card. The reflection of 
the beam directed at the vibrating window is aligned with the photo-sensitive element and changes 
in the coverage area and light intensity are translated to an analog voltage signal. Surprisingly, 
even commercialized devices based on this basic method are on sale [4, 23-25], albeit with more 
refined optical components and signal filtering. The disadvantage of the reflected light-intensity 
approach is that, since the beam undergoes nearly specular reflection [26], it is difficult to aim the 
beams at large distances and they generally lack advanced post-processing and filtration facilities. 
Precise laser interferometers are also commercially available for a variety of measuring 
applications [1, 2, 4]. Though marketed for civil engineering applications, certain models are 
especially suitable for long distance measurement, use an invisible infrared beam and are equipped 
with optical scopes for easy targeting [27] – suggesting a possibility that versions specialized for 
government use are available as well. Recently, the use of a photo-electromotive-force pulsed 
laser vibrometer as a laser surveillance microphone has also been proposed [28, 29]. Using 
scattered and reflected sunlight instead of laser beams for distant surveillance has been put forward 
as well, albeit without demonstrating this intriguing idea in a practical experiment [30]. Recently 
a team of researchers has introduced a novel optical sound recovering technique, possibly useful 
as a surveillance method: Davis et al. has demonstrated passive sound recovery via video images 
in [31]. 
The prevalent tactic used to prevent this type of surveillance is to build special safe rooms or 
entire buildings of critical importance without windows pointing to the outside [4, 13, 14, 26, 32], 
underground [33] or using a separate inner and outer shell for the building, like at the CIA 
headquarters in Langley [13, 34]. Other possible security measures are exterior meshes, windows 
with protective plastic films [2, 4, 14, 35, 36], planting trees [33], electrodynamic shakers 
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connected directly to the windows and other mechanical disruptions [1, 4], white noise audio 
generators [1, 37, 38] and other sound masking tactics [4], laser detectors [39], or optical signal 
jammers injecting high frequency laser noise into the surveillance signal [2, 8]. 
Of course, creating specialized safe rooms is a very expensive and often impractical 
countermeasure [4]. The efficiency of other passive or semi-active measures is difficult to assess 
due to the complete lack of publicly available comparative research literature on subject. While 
the performance of commercially available white noise generators, audio masking devices and 
mechanical shakers [37, 38] has not been evaluated in a systematic way either, these devices may 
create considerable background noise. The noise generated by these approaches may reach levels 
at which holding conversations in the protected area becomes increasingly difficult [1, 4]. 
To complement the array of countermeasures against laser microphones, this paper proposes 
a novel semi-active mechanical blocking of light-intensity optical instrument based signal 
intelligence of windowpanes, based on a piezoceramic transducer driven at the resonant frequency 
of the window surface. The article evaluates the simulated surveillance data gathered 
experimentally on a simplified laboratory model, while supplying the proposed piezoceramic 
transducer with different types of disturbance signals. The perception of the speech quality and 
intelligibility is evaluated subjectively and also objectively using an algorithm for speech 
perception quality measurement. The article investigates the noise level generated by the different 
signal types, and evaluates the effect of divergence from the identified resonance frequency on 
masking, in case the modal method is used. Recordings of the experimental tests are also made 
available [40]. 
Naturally, classified surveillance equipment is not available for laboratory testing, therefore 
the experiment and its results presented here are aimed at the first type of laser microphones 
introduced here: light-intensity based improvised devices or low-end commercial surveillance 
equipment. The dynamic range of the triangulation device used here is limited compared to the 
speculated coverage of specialized equipment. Therefore, the experimental measurement system 
used here cannot be deemed representative in general. 
After the formerly presented introduction, the instrumentation used in the experiment is 
reviewed in Section 2.1. This is followed by the experimental identification of the resonant 
frequency of the window surface in Section 2.2. The reader is familiarized with the objective 
speech quality measures considered in this work in Section 2.3. Next, the experimental scenario 
of simulating laser microphone surveillance is set forth in Section 3.1. The experiments comparing 
the masking effect of different signals driving the piezoceramic transducer are described in 
Section 3.2, while the properties of the modal masking method are shown in Section 3.3. The 
article is concluded by a review of results, possible technical and methodology issues and a 
discussion on future work in Section 4. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Instrumentation 
A window is modeled by a 4 mm thick Plexiglas (acrylic glass) sheet mounted to a 
500×450 mm frame with a 404×352 mm free surface area (Fig. 2). The measurement chain is 
schematically illustrated in Fig. 3. A SAL SBX 1320/BK medium bandwidth speaker is connected 
to a Genius SW-HF5.1 500 amplifier and is utilized to emulate speech in a closed room. A 
Keyence LK-G32 industrial laser triangulation sensor is placed at the side of the window opposite 
to the speaker, modeling the optical surveillance unit aimed at the window. While the construction 
and the working principle of this sensor are not suited for long distance or high quality intelligence 
gathering, it is considered here to be adequate for simulating a surveillance unit with simpler 
construction, respectively equipment available on the open market. The laser sensor is connected 
to a Keyence LK-G3001V central processing unit. The physical blocking of the optical 
surveillance unit is achieved by a MIDÉ QP16n lead zirconate trinitrate (PZT) transducer patch 
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bonded onto the bottom-middle section of the acrylic glass. The transducer gains its signal from a 
MIDÉ EL-1225 operational amplifier. 
 
Fig. 2. Model of a windowpane under surveillance with a piezoceramic transducer mounted on its surface 
 
Fig. 3. Schematic representation of the experimental system 
The measurement and algorithms are implemented on a personal computer running the 
Matlab xPC Target rapid control software prototyping platform, connected to hardware 
components with a 16 bit National Instruments PCI-6030E measurement card. The measurement 
system is developed in the Matlab and Simulink software environment, then loaded onto the 
Target platform via the TCP/IP protocol. The audio signals were sampled at 10 kHz rate with a 
16 bit resolution, though not particularly high quality, but commonly used and sufficient for vocal 
audio [41]. The signals were later downsampled to an 8000 Hz rate. The experimental setup and 
a detail of the laser sensor and the piezoceramic actuator are shown in Fig. 4. 
During the experiments an analog signal is supplied to the amplifier, which in turn drives the 
speaker emulating speech. Without the semi-active blocking signal the sound pressure causes 
small vibrations in the surface of the acrylic glass, which are picked up using the laser sensor 
emulating the signal intelligence unit. This is recorded for post-processing in the xPC Target 
computer. With the surveillance blocking signal activated, the investigated signal types are sent 
through the amplifier onto the piezoelectric transducer, disrupting the audio signature of speech 
inside the gathered data. 
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a) Experimental setup 
 
b) Laser sensor and piezoceramic transducer 
Fig. 4. a) The experimental setup and b) the laser triangulation head used  
to emulate the laser microphone and the actuating element 
2.2. Experimental identification of the resonant modes 
The experimental identification of the resonant modes of the acrylic window was performed 
by supplying a chirp signal to the piezoceramic transducer in the bandwidth of 0-150 Hz in 150 s 
time with a 60 V amplitude and 1 kHz sampling. The response of the window was recorded using 
the laser triangulation sensor. Analyzing this response in the frequency domain, as shown in Fig. 5, 
indicates that the first three resonant modes are located at 31.13 Hz, 96.65 Hz and 120.90 Hz 
respectively. This information was used later in determining the effectiveness of a passive 
sinusoidal blocking signal in agreement with the first resonant frequency. 
 
Fig. 5. Periodogram power spectral density estimate of the window response  
from the piezoceramic transducer, showing the first resonant peak at 31.13 Hz 
2.3. Speech perception quality and intelligibility evaluation 
As of today, the most accurate method to compare audio speech quality is through subjective 
listening tests [41, 42]. The conclusions of this article will be given based on such listening tests 
performed by the authors, while the following sections will also contain information and 
conclusions based on these trials. 
In addition to the formerly mentioned subjective tests, objective measures of speech quality 
and intelligibility were also analyzed using the algorithm collection provided by Ellis and  
Brookes, and are given here to allow for an unbiased evaluation of the results [43, 44]. Three 
different metrics are used here to quantify speech perception quality: NIST STNR which is given 
as the speech to noise ratio (SNR) defined as 10log ( ୱܲ୮ୣୣୡ୦,୮ୣୟ୩ ୬ܲ୭୧ୱୣ,୫ୣୟ୬⁄ ), where power ܲ 
refers to the variance of a signal computed over 20 ms windows [45]. The algorithm SNRvad 
gives a measure of the additional energy in speech regions determined by a crude voice activity 
detection (VAD) compared to the energy of the silent sections in between [43]. Finally, the 
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perceptual evaluation of speech quality (PESQ) score is given by the fully automatized algorithm 
of Hu et al. [42, 46], denoting speech quality on a 1-5 scale. A method based on waveform 
amplitude distribution analysis (WADA) proposed by Kim and Stern in [47] was also considered 
in the preliminary comparison, however its results were found to be unreliable and inconsistent 
with the subjective perception of the signal. As the scope of this article does not allow for a deeper 
introduction of these methods, the reader is referred to the bibliography sources for more 
information. 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Simulating the optical surveillance of a windowpane with post-hoc filtering 
In order to allow for an easier comparison of different blocking methods, the same ~15 s long 
speech signal down sampled from 44 kHz audio to 10 kHz was used to simulate human 
conversation in a room. The audio signal used throughout all the experiments is the NASA 
commentary on the occasion of the landing of the space shuttle Atlantis STS-135. The transcript 
is: “Nose gear touchdown. Having fired the imagination of a generation, a ship like no other, its 
place in history secured, the space shuttle pulls into port for the last time, its voyage at an end”. 
 
Fig. 6. Normalized waveform comparison of the raw surveillance signal from the laser sensor (grey),  
the original speech signal (green) and the filtered surveillance signal (blue). The automatically  
identified active voice segments are marked with red boxes 
After the laser system picked up the vibration on the surface of the window, the displacement 
signal was normalized to unit amplitude to increase its absolute volume [41]. Even though the 
resulting signal is noisy and distorted, the speech is intelligible [40]. As the real-time or post 
processing of the noisy signal is possible using advanced filtering techniques, the resulting 
surveillance data was also refined by a Wiener filter algorithm based on tracking a priori user SNR 
using the decision-directed method proposed by Plapous et al. [48]. It has been found that the 
harmonic regeneration noise reduction (HRNR) provided the best filtration results and an 
improvement in sound quality, however, the subjective intelligibility increase with this particular 
signal was not very convincing. Overall, the intelligibility of both the raw and the filtered 
simulated surveillance data was adequate. Albeit it was necessary to pay close attention to the 
reconstructed sound because of the bad quality audio, the meaning of the words and sentences 
could be distinguished well. 
The objective speech quality metrics are given in Table 1 for the original slightly noisy speech 
file, the raw displacement data from the laser sensor and finally the filtered result. 
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Fig. 7. Mean energy of the active voice segments (solid lines) and noise (dashed lines) in the original 
speech file (green), the raw surveillance data (grey) and the filtered surveillance data (blue) 
Table 1. Evaluation of the objective speech quality without semi-active countersurveillance measures 
 Original Raw Filtered 
NIST 25.0 dB 3.5 dB 81.8 dB 
SNRvad 6.1 dB –7.1 dB 5.4 dB 
PESQ – 1.6 (–) 2.0 (–) 
Standard techniques used for vocal audio visualization were utilized in order to illustrate the 
character of the speech signals recorded during the experiments [41]. The waveform of the 
surveillance data is shown in Fig. 6 for the original speech without a clean reference (green), the 
raw displacement signal (grey) and the post-processed and filtered signal (blue). Each 
measurement illustrates the time series data with its maximal amplitudes normalized to unit value. 
Active speech regions are marked with a crude voice activity detection algorithm [43]. The mean 
energy for the active voice segments (solid lines) and noise segments (dashed lines) are shown in 
Fig. 7 for the original speech signal (green), raw unprocessed surveillance data (grey) and the 
filtered surveillance data (blue). The maximum-scaled sub-band energy histograms in 1 dB bins 
are also shown for the original speech signal in Fig. 7, raw data in Fig. 7 and post-processed data 
in Fig. 7. 
 
a) Original signal 
 
b) Raw surveillance 
 
c) Filtered surveillance 
Fig. 8. Illustration of the clean speech from the original data file 
The purpose of the speech perception quality indicators shown in Table 1 and the 
visualized speech signals in Figs. 6-8 was to give an overall assessment of the quality of the 
simulated surveillance signal. Unfortunately, speech perception is still mostly evaluated based on 
subjective testing in industrial practice [41, 42], while standard visualization techniques may not 
always align with the character of the real audio signal. Therefore, the indicators shown here 
cannot fully demonstrate the difference between speech and surveillance data. Intelligibility of 
speech can be objectively characterized by the PESQ score using the time domain data in Fig. 6. 
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The PESQ score of 2.0 achieved with the filtered signal indicates a poor quality audio but 
intelligible speech, in agreement with examples given by McLoughlin [41] and our subjective 
findings. To compare the original source with simulated surveillance, it is recommended to listen 
to the recordings from the experiments, available online [40]. 
3.2. Evaluation of different semi-active blocking signals 
In order to determine the best available countermeasure approach using the piezoceramic 
actuator, four different semi-active signal disruption strategies were tested experimentally. All 
methods tested in this paper use the same experimental hardware, only the types of the signals 
supplied to the piezoceramic transducer have been varied. We may divide the considered signal 
types into two main groups: random non-correlated and sinusoidal. The random signals considered 
here were Gaussian noise with an amplitude variance of 20 V and uniform distribution random 
noise with a variance of 20 V, both with zero mean. The two types of sinusoidal signals tested 
here were a sinusoidal signal with an arbitrarily chosen 130 Hz frequency and the other with a 
frequency equal to that of the first resonant mode of the acrylic window, both with ±20 V peak 
amplitude. 
The resulting objective speech perception quality indicators are given in Table 2 for the four 
different countersurveillance signals. The indicator most consistent with the subjective speech 
quality evaluation of the authors is PESQ. Regrettably, the rest of the indicators, that is NIST [45] 
and SNR [43] show no clear correlation with the subjective quality and intelligibility of the audio 
signal. 
Table 2. Evaluation of the objective speech quality with different types of semi-active signals 
 Gaussian Uniform Sinusoidal Modal 
NIST 79.3 dB 80.3 dB 83.3 dB 80.5 dB 
SNRvad –6.2 dB –1.4 dB 5.1 dB 4.2 dB 
PESQ 1.3 (–) 1.7 (–) 2.0 (–) 1.2 (–) 
Effective Yes Yes No Yes 
Noise 90.5 dB(A) 87.5 dB(A) 62.3 dB(A) 54.8 dB(A) 
The sinusoidal signal with the arbitrarily chosen frequency did not sufficiently degrade 
surveillance data quality, the filtered signal was almost identical to the one without the 
countersurveillance system enabled. The random signals proved to be more effective in masking 
the speech signal, however, still failed to completely eliminate recognizable phrases or words from 
the surveillance data. Of the two random approaches, the Gaussian signal was slightly better than 
the signal with uniform distribution. The best of the four considered methods was the harmonic 
signal with a frequency equal to the first resonant frequency of the window. Neither the raw 
unfiltered displacement data nor the filtered surveillance data contained recognizable speech. 
Using mechanical and audio masking techniques to prevent laser listening, the surveillance 
countermeasure device may generate disturbing levels of ambient noise, which may render 
holding conversations difficult [1, 4]. The piezoelectric transducer combined with the window 
acts as a speaker generating audible noise as well. While increasing the amplitude of the masking 
signal and thereby increasing displacements of the window provided good results even 
considering the Gaussian and uniform random noise, the countersurveillance unit became 
increasingly noisy. The last line in Table 2 shows A-weighted sound pressure level measurements 
performed with a TENMA 72-860A sound level meter, which were carried out approximately 
~0.2 m away from the window surface. Compared to the ambient noise level of 53.1 dB(A), the 
modal countersurveillance signal caused no significant increase in the noise. The perceived noise 
was also virtually nonexistent since the driving frequency used was well below the human hearing 
threshold. The rest of the evaluated methods show higher noise levels, while the sound pressure 
from the random masking signals proved to be very bothersome. 
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Naturally, the noise levels may vary depending on the material properties and geometric 
dimensions of the target object. The stiffness of the simulated acrylic window is less than that of 
glass, therefore the results on noise levels cannot be generalized. The perceived noise from the 
modal masking was low partly because the resonant frequency of the window was near the lower 
hearing threshold. 
             
a) Waveform comparison 
 
b) Detail of the waveform comparison 
Fig. 9. Illustration of the waveform of the filtered surveillance data without counter-measures (grey),  
and with the Gaussian (green) and modal blocking strategy (blue).  
Active voice segments are marked with a red line 
  
Fig. 10. Illustration of the mean energy of the active voice segments (solid lines) and noise  
(dashed lines) in the surveillance data without countermeasures (grey), Gaussian blocking  
strategy (green) and modal strategy (blue). All signals were post-processed  
and filtered to enhance the information content of the speech 
The visualization of the surveillance data using different signals passed into the piezoceramic 
transducer is given in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. The results of the experiment using a sinusoidal signal 
with an arbitrary frequency and normally distributed noise are omitted from these illustrations to 
preserve clarity. The waveform of the filtered simulated surveillance data (grey) is compared to 
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the Gaussian noise (green) and modal sinusoidal (blue) countermeasure strategies in Fig. 9, with 
a detail section of the waveform presented in Fig. 8. The simulated surveillance data is compared 
in the frequency domain as well, Fig. 10 shows the mean energy of the active voice segments 
(solid lines) and noise segments (dashed line) without an active countersurveillance (grey), with 
the Gaussian strategy (green) and the proposed modal signal (blue). Similarly, to the visualized 
recordings in Section 4.1, the significance of these illustrations is limited. The time-domain 
waveform illustrates the degradation of the information content of the signal with the 
countermeasures engaged, however, for a more informative comparison the reader is referred to 
the recordings of the tests [40]. 
3.3. Properties of the modal signal blocking method 
After a small reconfiguration of the experimental system and a repeated identification 
procedure, the modal properties of the window have been slightly altered, with the first mode now 
located at the somewhat higher 35.22 Hz. 
The required precision of driving the piezoceramic actuator with the first resonant frequency 
necessary to achieve good signal blocking results was evaluated by introducing a small error in 
the supplied sinusoidal signal. This test evaluated subjective speech quality after performing 
filtering on the surveillance signal for the range of a ±5 % deviation from the first resonant 
frequency, given in 1 % increments and decrements to both sides. For the qualitative 
measurements neither the NIST nor the SNRvad methods provided results showing useful 
correlation with subjective speech quality, therefore only the results of the PESQ algorithm by 
Ellis [43] (blue line) and Brookes [44] (green line) are shown in Fig. 11. 
According to the subjective evaluation of the authors, a more than ±5 % deviation from the 
experimentally identified first resonant frequency renders the blocking signal completely 
inefficient and the surveillance signals start to contain recognizable words and phrases 
sporadically. A deviation of ±10-±20 % from the first mode renders the interference completely 
ineffective and the surveillance signal will be intelligible after filtering. The PESQ indicators in 
Fig. 11 at the extreme ends of this deviation range seem to confirm this finding. 
 
Fig. 11. Evaluation of the objective speech quality with variations  
in the modal frequency using different methods 
Higher modes – now shifted upwards in comparison with the previous experiment – were also 
tested to compare their effect in disrupting the surveillance signal. While the second modal 
frequency located at 74.1 Hz still provided good masking of the speech signal in the surveillance 
data, driving the piezoceramic transducers at the third mode located at 102.3 Hz did not indicate 
positive results, i.e. the countersurveillance method was largely ineffective. This phenomenon is 
expected, since the vibration amplitude tends to decrease with higher modes, therefore the speech 
signal will be less disrupted by exciting the window to higher modes. 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper evaluated the semi-active blocking of optical surveillance attempts by various 
mechanical disturbance signals induced by a piezoceramic transducer. Following a subjective and 
objective analysis of speech quality, it has been found that the proposed modal response-based 
semi-active counter-intelligence method can be effectively used in protecting critical 
infrastructure against covert surveillance via light-intensity laser microphones. According to the 
findings presented here, supplying the piezoceramic transducer mounted on the windowpane with 
high amplitude random mechanical noise may block the speech signal from the surveillance data 
effectively, but the side effect of the blocking is audible noise which can be bothersome to the 
occupants of the protected room. While the use of an arbitrarily chosen sinusoidal signal has been 
found largely ineffective, a sinusoidal disturbance with a frequency equal to the first resonant 
frequency of the windowpane may prevent surveillance attempts very effectively while generating 
only minimal added noise. The novel technical countersurveillance measure against improvised 
or low-end laser microphones set forth in this article expands the range of currently available 
methods. 
Of course, there are certain negative aspects and uncertain properties of the considered 
blocking mechanism. As there is no suitable laser Doppler velocity measurement available to the 
authors, the conclusion on the effectiveness of the approach cannot be entirely generalized. 
Although it proved to provide very efficient masking in the experiment presented here, the 
sinusoidal signal introduced to the piezoceramic patch is deterministic, which leaves room for 
speculation whether it would be possible to recover audio from the signal injected with this 
pure-tone mechanical noise. In case linearity is assumed, specialized equipment with higher 
dynamic measurement range could possibly extract a useful speech signal. Furthermore, newer 
and more advanced laser surveillance technology may pass through the window and register other 
vibrating objects in the room [2] – the efficacy of the proposed approach in this case is 
questionable. 
The proposed method also requires using a separate system tuned to the first resonant 
frequency of each individual window pane in the protected room. Since the objective indicators 
of speech perception quality considered here characterized the different semi-active blocking 
methods somewhat unreliably, it is desirable to find or propose a different measurement metric in 
upcoming work. 
To provide answers to these questions, further research is necessary. Future work shall contrast 
the commercially available technical countersurveillance products – such as audio generators 
[1, 37, 38], mechanical devices [1, 4] and protective films [2, 35, 36] – to the proposed modal 
blocking method. To our knowledge, no similar systematic studies exist as of today. One of the 
shortfalls of the experiments presented here is that they feature a plastic window instead of glass 
and instead of a laser interferometer an industrial triangulation system. This, and the need to 
analyze the possibility of recovering signals from the disrupted surveillance data shall be 
addressed in future studies. An additional countersurveillance method could involve the use of the 
feedforward adaptive x-LMS algorithm [49, 50] to actively compensate for the audio in the room 
using a reference microphone and an error accelerometer that should be mounted on the 
windowpane in addition to the piezoceramic actuator. 
This work or its authors are not affiliated, associated, authorized, endorsed by, or in any way 
officially connected with defense related research projects and are motivated strictly by scientific 
and technical curiosity. The central research theme of this work is not a subject of any ongoing or 
future contractual agreements, instead is a spinoff project of research in the field of active vibration 
and noise control. 
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